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Abstract 
This article presents a case study of the development of a local cultural form – 
Shanghai Yueju – caught up in the rapid urban redevelopment of post-socialist 
China. Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘distinction’, it analyses 
the processes of the reformation of taste and class in a Chinese city. It explores the 
following question: can high levels of financial investment revive Yueju and allow 
it to gain market success and cultural distinction? The question is examined in the 
context of Shanghai’s swift urbanisation process, throughout which the govern-
ment has reinforced its control over not only economic but also social and cultural 
capital. It suggests that ignoring Yueju’s rootedness in a local habitus of long his-
tory and focusing only on its economic organisation has had a damaging effect on 
the vibrancy and viability of this cultural form. This case study of Yueju in 
Shanghai suggests that economically driven cultural development could lead to 
the erosion of local culture and restricting its social and cultural innovation.  
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Introduction 
For Bourdieu ‘distinction’ is not just a mark of difference but of legitimacy based 
on power and influence: ‘(when the) differences are recognized, legitimate and 
approved’, it becomes ‘a sign of distinction’ (Bourdieu 1991: 238). In this paper, I 
will show how Shanghai Yueju Opera becomes implicated in new strategies of 
distinction attempted by the Shanghai municipal government in its vision to be-
come a ‘global city’. In the first part I trace the emergence and development of 
Yueju up to the reforms of 1992. In the second part I outline the Shanghai gov-
ernment’s use of culture in its urban development strategies. In part three I look 
more closely at transformations of class and consumption in post-reform Shanghai 
and how government attempts to reform and promote ‘high quality’ Yueju produc-
tions have been tied up in these changes. In part four I explore how this attempt to 
promote ‘high class’ productions has faced real problems in finding an audience. 
In the last part I look at evidence of innovative, ‘grass toots’ opera production and 
what prospects this might hold for the future.  
I Yueju in Pre-Reform China 
Prior to 1949, Shanghai’s ‘recognised, legitimate, and approved’ forms of culture 
were highly diverse. Pan described the original Shanghai ethos as ‘haipai’, a term 
denoting a new configuration of Western and Chinese cultural forms which grew 
up in the city’s relative autonomy from the rest of China (Pan 2008: 6). As the 
only Chinese city where migrants, refugees, entrepreneurs and scholars of differ-
ent nationalities coexisted, breaking from tradition was the norm in the city. Soon 
Shanghai was to be the centre of the May Fourth Cultural Movement (1915–
1923). Internationally, Shanghai was recognized as a unique Chinese model of 
modernity, reflecting the unruly spirit and hybridity of its commerce and culture 
(Bergere 2009).  
It was against this background that Shanghai Yueju was born and developed. 
Yueju is a folk song derived from Shenxian town in Zhejiang province. Yue is the 
ancient name of Shenxian town in Shaoxin region and Ju means staged drama or 
opera. First performed commercially, by male peasants turned street beggars dur-
ing the famine and flood period at the end of the nineteenth century, it became a 
popular rural concert and tea-house entertainment in Zhejiang. Shanghai was the 
first city in China to accommodate female workers and from the early twentieth 
century, a large flow of Zhejiang peasant girls came to work in Shanghai, as tex-
tile workers – and soon as Yueju performers (Honig 1986; Gao 1991). The first 
all-female troupe appeared in Shanghai in 1923 and by the mid 1930s, it had de-
veloped into the most popular cultural form among the working class migrants 
from Zhejiang province.  
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During the Japanese occupation (1937–1945), large numbers of entrepreneurs 
and politicians took refuge in Shanghai from nearby provinces. They turned to 
their local culture for nostalgia and consolation. This era was often referred to as 
the famous ‘Shanghai Isolated Island Culture’ (Shanghai Gudao Wenhua) (Gao 
1991; Ying 2002). It was during this time that Yueju peaked. Large numbers of 
Zhejiang middle class refugees entered Shanghai and their female family mem-
bers became loyal patrons of this cultural form. With their economic and political 
support, dozens of all-female troupes formed in Shanghai. By the mid 1940s, all-
female Yueju grew to become the second most popular local opera in Shanghai, 
resting its reputation on artistic innovation (Gao 1991: 49).  
Yueju as a symbol of Chinese modernity was largely due to its representation of 
the cultural identity of new urban women. During this period, Yueju had various 
names referring to its root in working class culture, such as ‘beggar’s song’ ‘didu 
song’, ‘Shaoxin civil opera’, ‘Shaoxin opera’, and others. The word YueJu first 
appeared in Shanghai newspapers in 1927, and in 1938 ‘Shanghai Theatre World’ 
(Xiju Shijie) first used ‘all-female YueJu’ to describe this art form (Gao 1991: 68 - 
71).  
Post 1949 Shanghai’s haipai identity was always viewed with suspicion by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter), who saw it as built on western power, 
capitalism and ‘decadence’. However, Shanghai all female Yueju received the 
direct patronage of the CCP and flourished for reasons I explain below. 
To the CCP, culture was for mobilising mass power for the winning of the revo-
lution (Schwartz 1968: 173; Mackerra 1983: 479). By the end of 1940s, over 85 
percent of the population was illiterate; in this context folk art, such as Yueju, was 
regarded highly by the CCP as form of education (Mackerras 1983: 158). The 
later premier Zhou Enlai, defined opera as: ‘A vital educational weapon of nation-
al spirit and patriotism because it has an intimate connection with the masses’ 
(quoted in Ying 2002: 178). As the majority of those illiterate were women (Co-
hen 1986), Yueju’s popularity amongst working class females was viewed as an 
important educational tool by the CCP. Throughout the 1950s, and before the out-
break of the Cultural Revolution, under direct CCP political and economic support 
we see the establishment of the Shanghai Yue Ju Company (SYC hereafter) sym-
bolizing the institutionalisation of Yueju. By the mid 1960s, Yueju had grown to 
become the second most widespread opera form in China, with the SYC being the 
largest state Yueju opera house. 
Despite its being heavily promoted by the national government, Yueju’s popu-
larity declined as a result of ‘over politicized’ production from the early 1960s (Fu 
2002; Ying 2002). During the ten years of the Cultural Revolution only eight 
model operas (yang ban xi) were performed nationally, with all other opera and 
cultural forms denounced. By the end of the 1970s, with at least two generations 
having grown up with little cultural exposure or education, Yueju’s popularity in 
Shanghai declined to its lowest historical point. Between the 1980s and 1990s, 
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Yueju was widely regarded as the opera for the elderly and middle aged female 
audience, most of whom were first generation Zhejiang immigrants and who were 
the poorest with the lowest education in the post-Mao economic reform era. Like 
many other opera forms in China at the time, Yueju was widely regarded as a folk 
culture format associated with the lower social classes.  
In 1992, after Deng announced China’s further economic development and giv-
ing Shanghai more autonomy in economic and cultural reforms, Shanghai was on 
its way to become the ‘Paris of the East’. It is during this time that traditional cul-
ture formats found their way back into mainstream society.  
II The Decentralised State: Building Economic and Cultural Capi-
tal in the new Shanghai 
Since the economic reforms began in 1979, increasing power has been devolved 
from central to local government (Zhang 2004). Regional governments act as 
‘managers’ for regional economic development with the central government re-
taining the right to change the ‘manager’ of each regional government at will. In 
this way, the central government retains control over the regions, whilst the re-
gional government is highly motivated in economic development. So long as the 
regional government follows the central government’s general line, it gains im-
mense power in regional development. As might be expected, this creates the 
conditions for frequent clashes between the central and local government. How-
ever, whilst local governments have inherited much of the economic development 
responsibilities from the central government, culture remains under the direct su-
pervision of the central government for political reasons. I will argue that the sep-
aration between economic development and cultural development at the local lev-
el has affected the redevelopment of Yueju in significant ways in Shanghai.  
Shanghai, as the ‘head of the dragon’, holds a leading role in the economic de-
velopment of the Yangtze river delta. Not only economic: in the decentralised 
China of today, the Shanghai government represents what Bourdieu describes as 
‘the concentration of the different species of capital,’ which ‘leads to the emer-
gence of a specific, properly statist capital which enables the state to exercise 
power over the different fields and over the different particular species of capital, 
and especially over the rates of conversion between them’ (1998: 42). That is, the 
Shanghai government plays a significant role not just in the accumulation and 
distribution of economic capital but also that of cultural capital – what is and what 
is not to be seen as ‘legitimate culture’.  
From the mid-1990s, as Shanghai received the green light for economic devel-
opment, the city also launched a wholesale reconstruction of the cultural land-
scape. In its attempts to ‘Manhattanise’ Shanghai the municipal government mo-
bilised its long association with ‘modernity’ as part of its re-invention as the new 
Asian metropolis for the 21st century.  
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As a statement of intent two new cultural symbols were built in Shanghai. The 
Shanghai Grand Theatre, built in 1998 at a cost of 1.2 billion RMB, the first pur-
pose built theatre in China aiming to cater for large-scale international performing 
arts, was placed in the People’s Square at the heart of the city centre. In 2005, the 
Shanghai Municipal Government invested another 1 billion RMB into building 
the Shanghai Oriental Art Centre in Pudong, the new financial and commercial 
centre. Both edifices aim to be symbolic of Shanghai’s aspirations to enhanced 
cultural status in the eyes of the international art world, hosting a wide range of 
Western productions, from Swan Lake to Cats and from the Berlin Philharmonic 
to the British Royal Ballet. These developments marked the commercialisation of 
‘high’ culture in Shanghai, attempting to move these off state subsidy by appeal-
ing to more high spending and foreign audiences. It thus also marked the accelera-
tion of a disconnect between a globally facing cultural profile and the everyday 
reality of locally produced culture. Fu Jin, a leading Chinese opera social critic 
explained:  
The Grand Theatre hosts 90 percent of Shanghai performing programmes and marks 
its legitimacy through high prices. Instead of old, small to medium theatre rental 
fees of between ten and twenty thousand RMB per performance, for a troupe to en-
ter the Grand Theatre, the rental cost is between 100 and 130 thousand RMB per 
performance. A popular saying in Shanghai opera houses today is: ‘In the pre-1978 
reform era, you worried about not having productions good enough to enter a thea-
tre. Today, you worry that you don’t have enough money to enter a theatre. (Inter-
view 9/7/2008) 
High prices, together with the western buildings, inject a sense of ‘legitimacy’ 
into the cultural forms hosted by these grand cultural edifices. The construction of 
a new cultural infrastructure also coincided with the wide scale urban develop-
ment of Shanghai from the early 90s. As a result, there has been a demolition of 
‘illegitimate’ cultural infrastructure: many of the small and medium theatres in old 
residential districts in the city, which have existed since the end of the nineteenth 
century and are directly associated with traditional operas, are on the list to be 
knocked down.  
These buildings are important to local opera development not only because they 
have existed for nearly one hundred years but also they were symbols of a local 
opera culture. Under Mao, performances were continually generated in these 
small to medium theatres to bring culture closer to the people. But in the recent 
urban regeneration, these community based theatre spaces are seen as old fash-
ioned and too small for Shanghai. But above all, the lands they occupy are now 
too expensive for ‘cultural’ uses. They are disappearing to make place for the new 
Shanghai. The demolition of the old theatre districts has had a devastating effect 
on the development of local opera by separating it from its audiences. The famous 
saying amongst opera companies in Shanghai is ‘each time we hear the word “re-
generation” we get nervous; urban regeneration removes theatres as well as our 
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audience.’ By the end of the 2000s, Yifu Theatre is the only one remaining in the 
People’s Square, where dozens of theatres used to be found.  
III Taste and Class in the new Yueju  
In order to allow local cultural forms to enter these newly built cultural spaces, the 
municipal government had to legitimize them first. This involved a hefty state 
subsidy to reform the business model and target a completely different kind of 
audience.  
In 1999 under leadership of former Shanghai Mayor Gong Xueping, a joint 
partnership was formed between the Shanghai Grand Theatre and the SYC, name-
ly the Dream of the Red Mansion Ltd. Xu Peilin, a local cultural entrepreneur, 
explained that the Shanghai municipal government invested 2 million RMB in 
producing the Luxury-Style Dream of the Red Mansion (Haohuaban Honglou-
meng), to be staged in the Grand Theatre for free (interview 8/6/2008). The Luxu-
ry-Style Dream of the Red Mansion is the most expensive Yueju production ever 
produced by the SYC. Borrowing words from Gong XuePing, the aim of the pro-
duction, according to SYC director You Boxin to make Yueju ‘bigger and more 
extravagant’ in order to ‘boost the yueju market’ (Interview 8/7/2008). In an era 
when scale and expense becomes a way of measuring legitimacy and distinction 
(Wang 2009), Shanghai Yueju has to abide by the rules in order to become legiti-
mate. 
In addition to annual subsidies, the government provided an additional 200,000 
RMB to promote the show including having it advertised for six months in ‘rota-
tion form’ (gundong) on the TV, radio and internet – all for free. It was also ad-
vertised on the city centre highway bridges to catch wider audiences. This was in 
a city where advertising fees had reached 38 million RMB a year for five-seconds 
of prime-time advertising (Zhao 1998: 58). Such practices aimed to raise the sta-
tus of Yueju from its folk cultural roots into ‘high art’ (gaoya yishu), to attract the 
Shanghai elite culture. 
From 1999 to 2002, this Luxury-Style Dream of the Red Mansion was per-
formed a total of thirteen times in the Grand Theatre. Tickets were sold at 1000 
RMB per person for the first show and for the following 12 shows at 500 RMB 
per person, which were the most expensive Chinese opera tickets ever sold in the 
market. People queued to get into the theatre and it was difficult to obtain a ticket 
without reservation. The scene was described as a ‘once in a hundred years event 
(bainian buyu)’. The programme seemed to have awakened the audiences’ love of 
Shanghai yueju. It became the most talked about subject in town at the time. The 
SYC vice president, the star performer of the Jia Baoyu character in this show, 
Qian Huili, stated in proud tones: ‘No other opera had ever entered the Grand 
Theatre before, we are the first!’ (Interview 8/6/2008). 
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It was through the local government’s support that Shanghai Yueju was redis-
covered and repackaged. In its process of being ‘recognized, legitimized and ap-
proved’, Yueju becomes ‘a sign of distinction’ (Bourdieu 1991: 238). With the 
backing of the officials, Shanghai Yueju was established as a legitimate and ap-
proved form of culture to be consumed by the elite class in the city.  
Bourdieu points out that cultural consumption is never an isolated social act but 
is meant to separate classes: ‘All cultural practices (museum visits, concert-going, 
reading etc.) function as markers of class’ (Bourdieu 1984: 1). With the glamour-
izing of Yueju, the consumption of this cultural form involved new distinctions of 
class and taste. However, Bourdieu emphasises that although we may appear to 
have a choice in classification through taste, those excluded from legitimate taste 
because of financial and education reasons, tend to internalise this exclusion. 
Bourdieu calls this internalisation of the exclusion about which we can do little 
the ‘taste of necessity’ (Bourdieu 1984: 234). We can see this occurring as Yueju 
was increasingly marketed to audiences with high economic and social capital. In 
their attempt to legitimize Yueju, the Shanghai government envisaged the emerg-
ing middle class as the main consumer group and thus felt it necessary to scale up 
the performances for the new elites in the city. This group has very different eco-
nomic and educational status from the traditional Yueju audience. 
Bourdieu stated in Distinction that ‘preferences in literature, painting or music 
are closely linked to educational level (measured by qualifications or length of 
schooling) and secondary to social origin’ (Bourdieu 1984: 190). How has Yueju 
been adapted to the young middle class after having been long associated with the 
old and the poor in the city? 
Most young middle class Shanghainese lack knowledge of traditional Chinese 
culture due to the period in which they grew up. Born in the 1960s and 1970s 
when culture, especially traditional Chinese culture, was being systematically 
erased by the Cultural Revolution, this generation has grown up with minimal 
exposure to traditional Chinese opera. The historical scenes of children watching 
opera in an open market space, hanging from rooftops and trees with their peers or 
sitting with parents could now only be read in novels. For many of the new middle 
class, cultural consumption through such forms of everyday social practice no 
longer occurs. They do not possess the knowledge to appreciate Chinese operas as 
did their parents’ generation. 
Scholars have observed high levels of foreign educational and cultural 
knowledge in the habitus of many Chinese youth during Mao’s era. Hamm, in 
Music and Radio in the People’s Republic of China (1991), highlighted how the 
young generation of the 1950s was raised on Russian literature. In order to restore 
the image of internationalization, the government was always keen to introduce 
western culture to ‘educate the good youth’ since China’s open door policy. Mac-
kerra (1983) stated that in the post-Mao era, the majority of urban youth took up 
western culture instead of Chinese traditional culture in order to show a level of 
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openness, international knowledge and cosmopolitan attitude. Gaining economic 
and social advance was the priority during this period, and in Shanghai this was 
exhibited through a distancing from traditional Chinese culture and aspirations to 
deal with foreign businesses and foreign culture. 
This middle class also includes the new migrants with high educational capital. 
The Shanghai Government was one of the first to relax the hukou system installed 
to prevent internal (especially rural-urban) migration. In 1992 alone, net immigra-
tion rose from 14,600 to 21,600. Immigrants were mainly university graduates. In 
1994 the net figure jumped to 74,200, the highest since 1980. The majority of the 
migrants allowed into Shanghai were university graduates from all over China – 
only those with a masters’ degree or above were permitted in, resulting in the new 
‘golden collar’ class (Wei 2008: 13). This newly admitted well-educated class, 
along with the local middle class shanghainese, is the driving forces of cultural 
consumption in Shanghai. 
The traditional Yueju audience came from a very different historical formation. 
The majority of the Yueju audience in post-Mao’s era is middle aged and elderly 
women. They don't like to go to the grand cultural sites, such as the Grand Thea-
tre, the surroundings of which are highly unfamiliar to them. Even if they do, their 
usual opera watching habits, such as chatting and snacking whilst watching per-
formances are highly undesirable to the new middle class consumers.  
Therefore, the intention behind the production of the Luxury-Style Dream of the 
Red Mansion, was to package Yueju for middle class consumption, with its beauti-
ful stage sets, pretty women, facile adventures, frivolous conversation and reas-
suring philosophy suited for the city’s ‘bourgeois’ audience who are also able to 
afford high prices (Bourdieu 1984: 234). High production costs have to be 
matched by high-ticket prices. Especially as from the early 1990s, the Shanghai 
Municipal Cultural Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal Consumer Price Bureau 
stopped subsidies for all opera companies. Opera tickets rose from one or two 
RMB in the early 1990s, to between 120 RMB and 1000 RMB at the current time.  
It is not new for the government or institutions to separate out classes through 
price based cultural consumption. DiMaggio (1977) points out that, in the 1860s, 
producers in America sometimes purposely raised production costs to create ‘high 
art’ as opposed to ‘low art’ in order to separate the classes. In the case of Shang-
hai, there may not have been an explicit purpose to separate classes as in 19th cen-
tury Boston, nevertheless the imposition of high production costs through the 
withdrawal of subsidies and an insistence on the ‘luxury style’ has de facto result-
ed in such a separation. The majority of the population in Shanghai has no access 
to such culture. It is through high ticket pricing that Yueju became associated with 
elite cultural and economic status.  
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IV Desperately Seeking the Audience 
In China, due to Mao’s egalitarian policies, social distinctions around economic 
capital only started to emerge in earnest after the 1980s. The middle aged bour-
geois audience, with high economic capital, central to Bourdieu’s account of the 
cultural field, was absent in China. Yueju’s traditional audience is pre-1949 emi-
grants from nearby Zhejiang province who are reluctant to spend excessive 
amount on cultural activities. As noted above, the majority of these were illiterate 
or semi-illiterate. Although this group were a quite well-established urban work-
ing class in the 1980s (Chan 1985), as the market economy took off in the early 
1990s they were about to become amongst the losers. In the mid 1990s, ten mil-
lion workers were laid off, of which seventy percent were women, aged thirty and 
above (Tian and Chu 2000: 155). Due to their low educational level, many could 
not find work afterwards. Warde (1993) pointed out that middle aged and elderly 
females make up the lowest economic, social and educational group in cities such 
as Shanghai. This group is referred to as the ‘disadvantaged group’ (ruoshi qunti) 
(Goodman 2008: 39). The high ticket price often leads to them being excluded 
from entering the Grand Theatre to taste Yueju.  
What about the new middle class? Economically, the middle class’s consump-
tion power has been ‘greatly exaggerated’ (Jiang 2007: 3). In Shanghai, this is 
directly associated with the high costs of the housing market as well as other liv-
ing costs (health and education, for example). Since the beginning of the property 
boom in 1992, Shanghai has seen the fastest rise in house prices in China. Those 
government employees who were assigned ownership of flats by their work units 
and ‘those dodgy businessmen who bought state assets from government friends 
during the fire-sale days of the late 1980s and early 1990s’ (Bell 2008: 26) were 
amongst the winners in this property game. This process also contributed to the 
rapid emergence of an urban poor. In an article on International Advertising, a 
Chinese market analyst describes what happened in Shanghai:  
Why have people felt that their money is not worth a penny? Home ownership ex-
penses keep shooting up […] last year, the salary rise for individual residents was an 
average 10.4 percent, yet the private housing market went up as high as 21.7 per-
cent. In 2004, housing took up 22.6 percent of a household’s total expenditure. The 
increase over spending on food, clothing, medical services, cultural consumption 
and entertainment was reduced to a slim 9.5 percent. (Yuan 2005: 56) 
With the rise of the property market, large numbers of Shanghai residents lost 
their spending power to high mortgage repayments, often becoming what is popu-
larly known in China as ‘the house slave’ (fangnu). Cultural consumption and 
entertainment were squeezed.  
Finally, rural workers make up around 70 percent of the national population. 
However, their rural registration and low educational level means they are often 
viewed as ‘illegal migrants’ in the cities. Their consumption capacity falls behind 
urbanites by at least ten to fifteen years (Jiang 2007: 3, 8). They are the least like-
ly to spare their cash for entertainment.  
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Thus we have the established migrant working class who have the cultural con-
nection with Yueju but were excluded because of the high ticket price; the young 
middle classes who should be able to afford these but lack the cultural connection 
and anyway are tied up in the property game; and the new working class made up 
of temporary peasant workers, with extremely low educational, economic and 
social status in the city, and denied effective access to any form of cultural con-
sumption in the city.  
So much for the taste of necessity; what of luxury? Who are the new Yueju con-
sumers in Shanghai? Shanghai Performing Art Company Director Ding Zhiyuan 
gave a good picture of the demography of Yueju audiences: 
According to our database, there is a regular ballet audience of around 3000 in 
Shanghai; a regular concert audience of around 4000, most of them are white collar 
workers. Some of them maybe described as ‘a pretending audience’, sitting there to 
give themselves a new identity. However, after a period of time, they will fall in 
love with Western art. Out of all operas, Yueju is the most popular opera and has the 
best market. We have a loyal regular Yueju audience of around 400, and the number 
is slightly lower for Jingju and Huju. […] The Yueju audience is a mixed group; in 
terms of age, twenty percent are between their teens and thirty, sixty percent are thir-
ty to forty five year olds, and twenty percent are forty five years and above. Espe-
cially in the last few years, with the promotion of young performers, their own fans 
began to emerge, and of course they are all young people, of the same age as the 
performers. (Interview 8/7/2008) 
This is a rather astonishing record, that in a city with a population of twenty mil-
lion, there are around 7,000 to 8,000 regular western cultural consumers but only 
400 for the yueju, which is regarded as the most popular local art form, with other 
opera forms attracting even less. This confirms that the middle class consumers 
have a better taste for western culture than for local Chinese culture. The newly 
built cultural infrastructure in the city reinforces such western oriented cultural 
consumption patterns. When interviewed Chinese opera social critic Fu Jin ex-
plained that the Shanghai Grand Theatre attracted the highest audience attendanc-
es, but that ninety percent of its performing art programme was western, leaving 
the small balance to local opera (9/7/2008). 
Yueju will have to compete with these western cultural performances for reve-
nue. According to Wu and Yusef (2002), Shanghai is acquiring the social shape of 
an ‘onion dome’ with fifteen percent forming an elite layer, and eighty five per-
cent the ‘have-less’ class’ (p. 6). This small elite consists of people with educa-
tional, economic, as well as political capital. As Andreas (2009) in Rise of the Red 
Engineers argued, a new elite ‘technocratic’ class emerged after Mao’s era, based 
on the combination of older educational capital with the new political capital 
gained through the 1949 revolution. This elite class not only has educational capi-
tal also political ties with the central and local government enabling them to ob-
tain crucial access to economic capital in the early economic reform era of 1980s 
and 1990s. It is this top 15 percent elite population that could develop the taste of 
‘luxury’ – consuming the legitimate art at the legitimate sites.  
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The formation of such a small class having the taste of ‘luxury’ is supported by 
the Shanghai Municipal Government. An anonymous official in the Shanghai 
Media stated: ‘High ticket prices are marked up purposefully to be purchased as 
presents, often for government officials, enterprises, and other networking pur-
poses. It is not really for the consumption of the people’ (Interview 9/6/2008).  
Foreign expats are also among the elite group who has been given the privilege 
to consume Chinese culture. The manager of the Shanghai Performing Art Com-
pany, Ding Zhiyuan insisted that shows in the Grand Theatre should not have ‘any 
yellow faces’ (Interview 8/7/2008). Professor Fu Jin, despite his criticism of the 
grand cultural buildings, approved the high-rise ticket prices for the ‘Red Man-
sion’: ‘It is a grand version of the performance; a lot of effort and money has gone 
into making this opera. I don’t think that it should be consumed by everyone, it 
should just belong to a certain group of people’ (interview 8/6/2008). In this view, 
the perception of Yueju as a cultural form for the ‘poor’ needs to be changed to 
that of ‘high art’ for the Shanghai elites.  
During this period, when the municipal government was promoting the ‘taste of 
luxury’ they knew very well that there was a large number of ‘flawed consumers’ 
who, as Bauman’s wrote: “…do not have the means to truly enter the shopping 
mall at all, do not have the means to truly enter into the consumer game’. They 
were also aware that ‘these consumers are leading to social degradation and “in-
ternal exile”’ (Bauman 1998: 38). But it is a priority to the municipal government 
to upgrade cultural infrastructure to match Shanghai’s new global cosmopolitan 
image. Granting right of access to a small group of high income professionals in 
the city and excluding low income people is their means of creating a sense of 
cosmopolitan glamour for the city.  
We also need to be aware of the heavy cost of such glitzy promotions and the 
dire consequences of short term commitment – as such high profile public subsi-
dies to culture are likely to be. After the ‘luxury’ version of the Dream of the Red 
Mansion, the government has never invested in another similar scale opera pro-
duction, and opera did not enter the Grand Theatre throughout the 2000s. In 2008, 
the SYC entered the Oriental Art Centre, performing the complete version of 
Dream of the Red Mansion. This time it was staged only twice. Yueju’s inability 
to prove itself worthy of economic investment to the local government through 
attracting self-sustaining funds was the main problem. Yueju faded from the posi-
tion of ‘most talked about cultural form in town’ soon after the local government 
ceased its support.  
Meanwhile, large numbers of Yueju fans are greatly deterred by the high price 
and grand, yet alien, theatre locations. Yueju’s new legitimate status failed to at-
tract either its traditional or its intended middle class audience. 
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V Yueju – Surviving through the ‘Black Box’ 
Having lost direct government’s support, Yueju has been increasingly marginal-
ised by the Shanghai Grand Theatre, to the degree that many people struggle to 
see Yueju. In reality, it is still regularly performed and popular amongst local au-
diences. In opposition to the emphasis on large productions and costly marketing, 
these performances are much smaller in scale, produced by individual SYC artists 
outside SYC working hours and they have managed to attract younger audiences. 
However, due to expensive advertisement fees and the illegality of performing in 
‘informal’ venues, it is only the ‘inner circle’ of artists who know where produc-
tions may be staged. These performances mainly take place in universities, in 
small enclosed theatre spaces known as a ‘black box’ (hei xiazi).  
In 2009, I was on an international opera exchange visit to Shanghai. The host 
team of Chinese theatre academics, government high officials and entrepreneurs 
struggled to provide us with information on contemporary Chinese opera perfor-
mances by saying: ‘It is very difficult to find such performances in Shanghai. 
They are either traditional operas, or modern dramas’. The international group in 
the end agreed to watch a modern drama at the Shanghai Theatre Academy. As 
we entered the theatre, I happened to see a small poster in the corridor, advertising 
a new yueju production in the next building. It turned out to be a very refreshing 
experience – no grand production and no star performer but young performers, 
trying to experiment with new ideas. The theatre of around fifty seats where it 
performed was full. There was an after-show discussion between the audience and 
artists around Yueju production in general and the theme of this show. The high 
spirit shared by the artists and audience in this theatre is rarely seen in today’s 
legitimate theatre spaces.  
The audience was mainly opera artists, young professionals and students. The 
relatively inexpensive tickets are affordable for most young people. The success 
of these black box performances makes a powerful contrast to the Grand Theatre 
in their promotion of local culture. In fact, the Grand Theatre, despite its high cul-
ture intake, has been unsuccessful in promoting this culture as a business proposi-
tion. Whilst high production costs might momentarily change the public percep-
tion of Yueju, it is difficult to change what it is as a historically evolved cultural 
format and the associations that go with that. Yueju derived from local folk culture 
and its roots within it cannot be completely erased in search of new kinds of audi-
ences and profit. 
Zhao Zhigang, former Vice President of the SYC, is now one of the main con-
tributors to ‘black box’ productions and shared his delightful creative experience 
with the young audience while performing in a black box venue:  
I performed Yueju Hamlet in a “black box” small university theatre. There were no 
props on stage. I came out all in white, one spot light on me. I walked down, 
amongst the audience, looking for my deceased bride. Suddenly, a phone went off, 
so I said: “Whose phone was it, switch it off please!” You could imagine the audi-
ence were furious. Then I took the phone out of my own pocket and answered it, 
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carried out a dialogue which was supposed to be between myself and my deceased 
bride […] then in the next scene I walked amongst tomb stones, but I used the audi-
ence as tomb stones and walked amongst them. When I cried in front of my de-
ceased bride, I held a female audience member as if she was the tomb stone, she was 
really scared! Everyone enjoyed this Yueju production. (Interview 9/7/2008) 
Although the black box has ignited some hope for the revival of Yueju, its future 
is still uncertain without this cultural form being exposed to a wider local audi-
ence. The hidden space of the black box can only offer a temporary alternative to 
the expensive grand theatre and the fast diminishing old theatres; it cannot guaran-
tee the availability of Yueju in the long term. Without local government support – 
as part of everyday rather than elite culture – the development of Yueju will re-
main hidden and illegitimate.  
Conclusion 
In China’s vast economic development era, cultural production and consumption 
are becoming increasingly commercialised. Many forms of local culture are re-
packaged to serve an elite class with high economic, social and political capital. 
Although Yueju has gained some high cultural ground by being promoted by the 
government, it is losing its connection both with its actual and potential audience, 
and with those who are essential to the evolution of Yueju in terms of content pro-
duction. Local government is influential in preserving and transforming local cul-
ture in many ways, but with its eyes on a global audience it has promoted the con-
nection between legitimate culture and up-market consumption. Such a strategy 
may well be short-lived. I have argued that it might be possible to change the per-
ception of certain cultural forms for a short time – through heavy promotion and 
restricting access – but it is difficult to change the culture – its social and aesthetic 
roots – so rapidly and so instrumentally. Yueju was briefly turned from popular 
culture to high art through government support and allowed to occupy a highly 
visible space, only to then find itself struggling to attract the right audience. Once 
the government’s support ceased it was impossible for Yueju to continue this ‘up 
market’ route. This situation was made worse by the scarcity of formal perfor-
mance spaces and the inaccessibility of grand cultural facilities to small local per-
formances. Although Yueju has managed to sustain itself through performing in 
cheaper and smaller scale venues, access by the wider public remains restricted 
without the support and acknowledgement of local government.  
There are however other examples in China which might point to possibilities 
of changing cultural policy in Shanghai, in order to sustain the long term devel-
opment of Yueju. For example, the Zhejiang government views Yueju as essential 
in building its local cultural identity and subsidises performances through provid-
ing free venues to opera companies whose actors have won the Plum Flower 
award (the highest award for opera performers in China). The Hong Kong gov-
ernment too provides local cultural performances with generous subsidies. When 
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SYC performed in Hong Kong, in a similar scale theatre to the Shanghai Grand 
Theatre, they were charged only 13,000 RMB for four days’ rent – much cheaper 
than the 100-130,000 RMB per performance to rent the Shanghai Grand Theatre 
(Xu Peilin, Interview, 8/6/2008).  
In 1945, Yuan Xuefen and other star Yueju performers wanted to build their 
own theatre so that artists would not be exploited by backstage managers and 
could develop Yueju (Gao 1991; Yuan 2002). Sixty years later, in 2008, Li Li, the 
current Director of the SYC stated: ‘If only we had a theatre of our own, we could 
perform regularly, we could experiment, we could develop. At the moment we 
can do nothing but survive’ (Interview 9/7/2008). 
Dr Haili Ma was a professional Yueju Xiaosheng (male impersonator) at Shang-
hai Luwan Yueju Company before moving to the UK. After completing a PhD at 
the Univesity of Leeds, she is now running her own Consultancy for inter-cultural 
theatre productions. E-mail: haili@maculturalassociates.com 
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